The Supreme Court\u27s Rhetorical Hostility: What Is  Hostile  to Religion Under the Establishment Clause? by Ravitch, Frank S.
BYU Law Review
Volume 2004 | Issue 3 Article 5
9-1-2004
The Supreme Court's Rhetorical Hostility: What Is
"Hostile" to Religion Under the Establishment
Clause?
Frank S. Ravitch
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Courts Commons, First Amendment Commons, and the Religion Law Commons
This Conference Proceeding is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Frank S. Ravitch, The Supreme Court's Rhetorical Hostility: What Is "Hostile" to Religion Under the Establishment Clause?, 2004 BYU L.
Rev. 1031 (2004).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2004/iss3/5
5RAV-FIN 10/13/2004 7:36 PM 
 
1031 
 
The Supreme Court’s Rhetorical Hostility:  
What Is “Hostile” to Religion Under the 
Establishment Clause? 
Frank S. Ravitch.∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The use of the term “hostile” to describe the treatment of a 
person, idea, or entity generally implies that there is some negative 
intent or feeling involved—that is, that the treatment is actually 
hostile. Yet when the United States Supreme Court has used that 
term in connection with government entities’ treatment of religion, 
the Court has failed to adequately explain what it means by 
“hostility.”1 Recent decisions indicate the Court has presumed that 
the failure of government entities to follow the dictates of formal 
neutrality is sometimes hostile to religion,2 although the Court has 
∗ Associate Professor of Law, Michigan State University College of Law. This Article is 
based, in part, on a presentation given as part of the Association of American Law Schools 
Section on Law and Religion panel at the Association’s annual meeting that took place in 
Atlanta, Georgia, in January 2004. I am grateful for the comments and questions raised by my 
fellow panelists Tom Berg, Fred Gedicks, Steve Gey, and Brett Scharffs, and for those raised by 
members of the audience. Special thanks also go to Brett Scharffs for arranging and chairing 
the panel. 
 1. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 827–28 (2000) (plurality opinion) 
(suggesting that the dissent “seemingly . . . reserve[s] special hostility for those who take their 
religion seriously”—apparently because the dissent did not apply formal neutrality—but 
without explaining further why this is hostility); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. 
of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 845–46 (1995) (explaining that the viewpoint discrimination under the 
facts of the case “would risk fostering a pervasive bias or hostility to religion,” without 
explaining how viewpoint discrimination based on an erroneous interpretation of the 
Establishment Clause, but not on antagonism toward religion, would risk fostering hostility as 
opposed to bias against religion); Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 9 (1989) (noting 
that “government may not be overtly hostile to religion,” without explaining what would 
constitute such hostility). 
 2. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 827–28 (plurality opinion); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 845–46; 
cf. Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Schs. v. Mergens ex rel. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 248 
(1990) (plurality opinion) (“[I]f a State refused to let religious groups use facilities open to 
others, then it would demonstrate not neutrality but hostility toward religion.”). But see Locke 
v. Davey, 124 S. Ct. 1307, 1313–14 (2004) (holding that it is not hostile to religion to deny 
funding for training as a minister under a generally applicable funding program). 
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never seriously attempted to justify this characterization. The 
Supreme Court’s use of the term in the Establishment Clause 
context thus appears to be only rhetorical. If the Court uses a 
powerful term such as “hostility,” however, it should do so only 
when actual hostility is involved. 
The Court’s rhetorical use of hostility is consistent with its recent 
tendency toward formalism in religion clause analysis.3 The problem 
is that the trend has led to a doctrine that is based on unstated 
principles. Yet the Court attempts to substantiate this doctrine with 
different concepts, such as “neutrality” and “hostility,” which are 
mostly rhetorical. In several important contexts, the Court has begun 
to use bright-line tests that seem to depart from earlier precedent but 
derive significant support from concepts and terminology that the 
Court never adequately justifies or explains.4 
In cases such as Mitchell v. Helms,5 the Court uses the term 
“hostility” without ever defining it or connecting it to hostile 
motives. It seems the Court applies the label of “hostility” to justify a 
result, but because the Court applies it to situations that may have 
little to do with “hostility” as commonly understood, the Court’s 
rhetoric may turn into a blunt instrument to cast even mildly 
separationist doctrine and policies as hostile—and thus violative of 
the Court’s new formal neutrality principle. This has an Alice-in-
Wonderland-like impact, as Justices use the term “hostility” in 
situations where there is no hostility, and then, based on that term, 
find that the government action is not neutral, when the Court’s 
 3. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (upholding a voucher 
program in which more than ninety-six percent of tuition vouchers went to religious schools, 
where the bulk of the seats were available to voucher students, because the program was 
facially neutral and allowed parents to “choose” where to send their children); Mitchell, 530 
U.S. at 793 (plurality opinion) (holding that facial neutrality is the primary test for judging the 
constitutionality of a government program through which equipment was lent to schools, 
including religious schools); Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that 
exemptions to laws of “general applicability” are not mandated by the Free Exercise Clause). 
But see Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (applying the less formalistic 
endorsement, coercion, and Lemon tests to hold prayer at public high school football games 
unconstitutional). 
 4. See, e.g., Frank S. Ravitch, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to Neutrality: Broad 
Principles, Formalism, and the Establishment Clause, 38 GA. L. REV. 489, 490–513 (2004) 
(criticizing the Court’s shift to a formalistic neutrality approach in Establishment Clause cases 
and asserting that the Court utterly fails to explain how its approach is neutral or how 
neutrality can exist in religion clause disputes). 
 5. 530 U.S. 793 (2000). 
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neutrality concept has little to do with neutrality, if neutrality is even 
possible in this context.6 Interestingly, the Court’s use of hostility in 
its most recent funding decision, Locke v. Davey,7 suggests a limit to 
this trend, but the Court’s brief discussion of hostility in that case 
seems to conflict with the use of the same concept in other cases.  
Significantly, this Article is not an entry in the long-standing 
debate over whether separationism and/or secularism are biased 
against religion.8 While I disagree with those in the debate who 
automatically equate bias or bad effects with hostility toward 
religion, this article is not an attempt to either defend or refute the 
role of separationist principles in the Establishment Clause context. 
It does, however, suggest that those who equate separationism with 
bias against religion should stick with the concept of bias (whatever 
its merits across issues) and use the concept of hostility only when 
there is evidence of actual hostility as discussed below. Part II of this 
Article will provide background on the Court’s use of the concept of 
hostility and some of the concerns raised by the Court’s approach. 
Part III will analyze the Court’s use of hostility under the 
Establishment Clause and suggest that the Court has moved toward 
equating separationist motives with hostility. While this connection 
may be accurate in some limited contexts, the Court has not 
seriously attempted to explain it. Part IV will assert that hostility 
toward religion is a real concern that needs to be addressed but that 
the lack of formal neutrality is not adequate proof of this hostility. 
 6. I have argued that it is not. See generally Ravitch, supra note 4. 
 7. 124 S. Ct. 1307 (2004). Locke will be discussed in greater detail in the next section 
of this Article. See infra pp. 1036–38.  
 8. I would suggest that in some contexts they are. For a discussion of this debate, see, 
for example, PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (2002) (discussing 
the history of separation and suggesting that separationism has historically been connected to 
hostility toward religion); LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT (Univ. N.C. Press, rev. ed. 1994) (discussing the history of 
separation and its role in protecting religion and religious freedom); Douglas Laycock, The 
Many Meanings of Separation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1667 (2003) (reviewing Hamburger’s book 
and suggesting that Hamburger oversimplifies the justifications for separation)); see also, Steven 
K. Green, Of (Un)Equal Jurisprudential Pedigree: Rectifying the Imbalance Between Neutrality 
and Separationism, 43 B.C. L. REV. 1111, 1117–25 (2002) (addressing the relationship 
between neutrality and separation and further addressing various views of separation). 
5RAV-FIN 10/13/2004 7:36 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2004 
1034 
 
II. BACKGROUND 
In recent years the Court has used the concept of hostility 
toward religion primarily in cases involving equal access,9 but the 
concept is also finding its way into the government aid context.10 In 
both these realms, the Court (or a plurality of Justices) has in essence 
said that failure to treat religious entities and individuals like all other 
entities and individuals is hostile toward religion. Thus, the Court 
seems poised to treat hostility and lack of formal neutrality11 as two 
sides of the same coin. 
I have argued elsewhere that the current Court’s notion of 
formal neutrality is an empty concept because neutrality does not 
and cannot exist, at least not in the Establishment Clause context.12 
In contrast, hostility toward religion can exist, and thus, it is a 
different kind of concept than neutrality: whereas neutrality makes an 
untenable universal claim,13 hostility does not. Of course, the fact 
 9. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 845–
46 (1995) (ruling that a university cannot deny funding to a religious student newspaper if it 
allows other non-school-sponsored student groups and publications access to such funding); 
Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Schs. v. Mergens ex rel. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 248 (1990) 
(plurality opinion) (upholding the Equal Access Act, which requires that public secondary 
schools give religious, political, and other groups access to meet at school facilities if other 
non-curriculum-related student groups are given access). 
 10. See, e.g., Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 827–28 (suggesting that the exclusion of religious 
schools from a government program that provided loaned equipment to qualifying schools is 
hostile to religion). 
 11. Formal neutrality requires that there be facial neutrality of government action—the 
government cannot intentionally favor or discriminate against religion or a specific religion. In 
the context of government aid—financial or otherwise—there must also be private choice, 
which requires that the aid flows literally or figuratively through the hands of private 
individuals before reaching a religious institution or organization. See Zelman v. Simmons-
Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 649–53 (2002). 
 12. Ravitch, supra note 4, at 498–513; see also STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED 
FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 96 
(1995) [hereinafter SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE] (“The foregoing discussion suggests 
that the quest for neutrality, despite its understandable appeal and the tenacity with which it 
has been pursued, is an attempt to grasp at an illusion.”); Steven D. Smith, Symbols, 
Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the “No Endorsement” Test, 
86 MICH. L. REV. 266, 316 (1987) (“[O]ur attempts to say what neutrality means turn out to 
be indeterminate and deeply ambiguous.”). 
 13. Ravitch, supra note 4, at 498–513 (suggesting that the concept of neutrality makes 
an inherent universal claim); cf. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE, supra note 12, at 97 (“The 
impossibility of a truly ‘neutral’ theory of religious freedom is analogous to the impossibility, 
recognized by modern philosophers, of finding some outside Archimedean point . . . from 
which to look down on and describe reality.”). 
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that hostility can exist does not mean that the Court’s use of the 
concept is accurate—this Article argues that it is not. Inaccuracy in 
the use of the term “hostility” was less problematic in earlier 
decisions in which the Court did not connect the term to formal 
neutrality, although a strong argument can be made that earlier 
Courts did not take hostility toward religion as seriously as they took 
religious favoritism.14 Still, the Court has long held that “hostility” 
toward religion is prohibited by the First Amendment.15 Yet the 
Court has done a poor job of defining “hostility” and the current 
Court’s choice of definition has little to do with real hostility.16 Since 
“hostility” has generally served as a tangential rhetorical justification 
for decisions, this concern has been little explored. 
This is not simply a debate over semantics because terms such as 
“hostility” and “neutrality” represent concepts (however poorly 
defined) that the Court uses to justify its decisions. If the Court’s 
“hostility” is not hostile and its “neutrality” is not neutral, the 
Court’s approach must rest on some other footing. By failing to 
define and explain that footing, the Court forces those who question 
its approach to spar with shadows.  
The oft-cited argument that the Court has simply chosen a 
baseline for neutrality does not solve the problem because there is no 
neutral place from which to create that baseline.17 Thus, even though 
hostility toward religion can be real, the Court’s evolving concept of 
hostility is problematic because the Court’s apparent baseline for 
hostility is the lack of neutrality, which itself has no adequate 
 14. This has been reflected in a great deal of scholarship that has suggested that 
liberalism (or secularism) is hostile to religion when it attempts to keep public discourse and 
public life primarily secular. See, e.g., Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Hostility to Religion, 
American Style, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 263, 268–70, 298, 300–03 (1992); Frederick Mark 
Gedicks, Public Life and Hostility to Religion, 78 VA. L. REV. 671, 671–74, 678–86, 693–96 
(1992). I agree with these authors that a pervasive favoring of secular principles in all public 
contexts can be biased against (some would say for) religion, but while such bias may be 
unconstitutional in some circumstances, it is not generally based on hostility. See infra Parts 
III–IV. 
 15. See, e.g., Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963) (“We agree of course 
that the State may not establish a ‘religion of secularism’ in the sense of affirmatively opposing 
or showing hostility to religion . . . .”). 
 16. Of course, the same could be said of the Court’s earlier definitions, but it is the 
potency of the concept when combined with formal neutrality that makes the current Court’s 
experimentation with the concept troubling. See infra notes 18–42 and accompanying text. 
 17. Ravitch, supra note 4, at 493–94; see also Steven D. Smith, The Restoration of 
Tolerance, 78 CAL. L. REV. 305, 319–24 (1990) (critiquing the argument that neutrality 
requires a baseline and rejecting neutrality as an empty ideal). 
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baseline. Using a concept that itself has no adequate baseline as a 
baseline for hostility simply removes the problem by one degree; it 
does not solve it. 
Recent cases supply examples of the Court’s subtle but forceful 
use of the concept of hostility in the Establishment Clause context. 
The Court’s use of the concept seems to be evolving (or devolving) 
over time. In Mitchell v. Helms,18 a case involving a government 
program that lent educational equipment to public and private 
schools, including religious schools, a plurality of the Court held: 
The pervasively sectarian recipient has not received any special 
favor, and it is most bizarre that the Court would, as the dissent 
seemingly does, reserve special hostility for those who take their 
religion seriously, who think that their religion should affect the 
whole of their lives, or who make the mistake of being effective in 
transmitting their views to children.19 
The plurality simply assumed that the position of the 
respondents and the dissenting Justices in Mitchell reserved “special 
hostility for those who take their religion seriously,” without 
identifying any actual government hostility to religion.20 There are, 
of course, many possible reasons for the position taken by the 
respondents and the dissenting Justices short of hostility. It is one 
thing to challenge a doctrine—based on that doctrine’s history—that 
was born of actual hostility toward a religion,21 but quite another to 
assert that those who adhere to a doctrine do so out of “special 
hostility” when that doctrine has evolved over the years to serve 
other purposes. 
More recently, in Locke v. Davey,22 the Court suggested that not 
every government decision to deny funding based on the religious 
interests of funding recipients is hostile to religion. In Locke, the 
Court held that the State of Washington could deny funding under a 
 18. 530 U.S. 793 (2000). 
 19. Id. at 827–28 (plurality opinion). The plurality later noted the abominable, but 
sadly effective, anti-Catholic influence on the opposition to funding sectarian schools from the 
late eighteen hundreds to more recent times—a true example of hostility toward religion (or a 
specific religion). Id. at 828–29 (plurality opinion). For further discussion of this animus, see 
infra notes 61–71 and accompanying text. 
 20. Id. at 827–28 (plurality opinion). 
 21. For an interesting, but highly critical, discussion of the history and evolution of 
separationist doctrine, see HAMBURGER, supra note 8. 
 22. 124 S. Ct. 1307 (2004). 
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facially neutral scholarship program to a student who planned to use 
that funding for ministerial training.23 The state denied the funding 
because to provide it would have violated the state constitution’s 
equivalent of the Establishment Clause, a clause that is broader than 
its federal counterpart.24 The state did allow students under the 
program to use the scholarships at any accredited college or 
university, including religious institutions.25 Thus, the state only 
precluded funding for training in devotional theology. Joshua Davey 
asserted that the denial of funding violated his rights under the Free 
Exercise Clause. The Court noted the tension between the two 
religion clauses in such cases but held both that there is some “play 
in the joints” between the two clauses and that a state decision not 
to fund training for the clergy fell within this play.26 The holding was 
limited to training in devotional theology and thus did not address 
the broader question of whether a state could deny funding to 
religious institutions generally under a facially neutral funding 
program. 
Interestingly, the Locke Court used the term “hostility” several 
times in the opinion.27 For example, the Court noted: “That a State 
would deal differently with religious education for the ministry than 
with education for other callings is . . . not evidence of hostility 
toward religion.”28 The Court also noted that the fact that the state 
allowed the scholarships to be used at religious institutions, so long 
as the student is not training for the clergy, supports the argument 
that the denial of the scholarship in Davey’s case was not evidence of 
hostility.29 It is important to note that the Locke Court seemed to 
 23. Id. at 1309. 
 24. Id. at 1312. 
 25. Id. at 1310. 
 26. Id. at 1311–12, 1315. 
 27. Id. at 1313–14. 
 28. Id. at 1313. 
 29. Id. at 1314–15. It is interesting that Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Locke, 
which Justice Thomas joins, accuses the state of discriminating against religion, id. at 1319–20 
(Scalia, J., dissenting), but does not use the term “hostility” in a context relevant to this 
Article. Justice Scalia does use the term in an unrelated context. See id. at 1316 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (“One can concede the Framers’ hostility to funding the clergy specifically . . . .”). 
Justice Scalia is clear that such discrimination need not be the product of animus in order to be 
problematic. Id. at 1318–20 (Scalia, J., dissenting). This might simply be a result of the 
parameters of the Locke case itself, or it could reflect an intentional decision to use more precise 
concepts in addressing the disadvantaging of religion or religious perspectives. This Article 
suggests, infra Parts III–IV, that focusing on discrimination rather than hostility would be a 
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connect hostility with animus, as this article suggests is appropriate,30 
although the Court was not clear about this. Yet it is hard to gel the 
Court’s approach to the concept of hostility in Locke with its use of 
that concept in cases like Mitchell, Rosenberger, and Mergens, none of 
which involved proof of animus toward religion.31 If Locke signals a 
move toward defining “hostility” in some concrete way that has 
something to do with actual hostility, this would be a welcomed 
development. This is unlikely, however, given the limited context 
and holding in Locke and the Court’s general failure to define the 
concept in other recent cases. 
In Good News Club v. Milford Central School.32 and Rosenberger v. 
Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia,33 the Court held that 
the refusal to allow religious organizations to use public-school 
property for meetings and the denial of funding for a religious 
student publication, respectively, were viewpoint discrimination. 
Neither of these cases is exceptional in the free-speech context as 
there is ample support for the notion that the exclusion of religious 
entities from a public or limited public forum is content and/or 
viewpoint discrimination,34 although both cases applied that concept 
to situations not addressed in prior opinions.35  
positive step because it is possible to engage in disparate treatment based on establishment or 
other concerns without being hostile toward religion. Yet both Justices Scalia and Thomas 
were members of the Mitchell plurality and have used the ill-defined concept of hostility 
elsewhere, so it is unlikely that Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Locke signals an intent to 
abandon the hostility concept in other contexts. 
 30. See infra Part IV. 
 31. See supra notes 18–20 and accompanying text; infra notes 33–42 and accompanying 
text. 
 32. 533 U.S. 98 (2001) (ruling that a Christian group focused on children in an 
elementary school must be given access to a school building for meetings if other non-
curriculum-related student groups are given access). 
 33. 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (holding that a university cannot deny funding to a religious 
student newspaper if it allows other non-school-sponsored student groups and publications 
access to such funding). 
 34. See, e.g., Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 
(1993) (holding that the exclusion of a church from using school facilities at night to show a 
film was unconstitutional); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (ruling that a religious 
student group is entitled to use university facilities that are open to other student groups). 
 35. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106–07 (applying a free-speech argument developed 
in the secondary and postsecondary education context to prohibit the exclusion of an 
elementary-school religious club from a common school building that included the elementary 
school); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829–30 (applying the public-forum argument developed in 
the government property context to a government funding program that provided funding for 
student publications). 
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 Interestingly, in both cases the government entities asserted that 
they were motivated by Establishment Clause (or related state law) 
concerns; the Court, however, treated their actions as hostile to 
religion.36 In each case the Court cited Board of Education of 
Westside Community Schools v. Mergens ex rel. Mergens,37 in which the 
plurality held, “if a State refused to let religious groups use facilities 
open to others, then it would demonstrate not neutrality but 
hostility toward religion.”38 The Mergens plurality, quoting Justice 
Brennan’s concurring opinion in McDaniel v. Paty,39 further defined 
what it meant by “hostility”: 
The Establishment Clause does not license government to treat 
religion and those who teach or practice it, simply by virtue of their 
status as such, as subversive of American ideals and therefore 
subject to unique disabilities.40 
The Mergens plurality seems to have assumed that the exclusion 
of a religious student club would constitute such a government-
imposed disability and, at least implicitly, that such would be the 
intent. Yet, there are many possible reasons for such treatment that 
have nothing to do with hostility toward religion.41 
It is important to note that the Court has not used the concept 
of hostility in all of its recent Establishment Clause decisions. The 
decisions in which it has used that concept, however, suggest that it 
is poised to use its rhetorical hostility in tandem with the doctrine of 
 36. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106–07; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829–30.  
 37. 496 U.S. 226 (1990). 
 38. Id. at 248 (plurality opinion). 
 39. 435 U.S. 618 (1978). 
 40. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 248 (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 641 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment)). 
 41. I would add that even though excluding the group may not have been hostile, it 
could, and should, be found unconstitutional regardless of the Equal Access Act. The reason 
for this lies in the Free Speech Clause, however. If government creates a public or limited 
public forum and denies access to religious groups while allowing other groups to meet, 
government places religion at an unfair disadvantage in the marketplace of ideas. See generally, 
Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993) (holding that a 
school district could not make its building available to groups discussing family issues from a 
variety of perspectives and deny access only to those wishing to discuss such issues from a 
religious perspective). As I have argued elsewhere, however, there are important reasons for 
limiting this analysis to the Equal Access context. Ravitch, supra note 4, at 524, 526–28, 530–
31, 570–71.  
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formal neutrality that it has developed in recent decisions;42 thus, the 
concept may come to occupy an important place in the Court’s 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 
III. THE SUPREME COURT’S EVOLVING  
DEFINITION OF HOSTILITY 
In the recent cases where the Court has referred to “hostility,” 
the Court may be suggesting that the effect of separationist policy is 
hostile to religion—that is, separationist policy has a disparate impact 
that negatively affects religion or a specific religion. While this is 
perhaps accurate, it is ironic, since the Court refused to consider the 
impact of the programs in question when defining “neutrality” in 
cases where policies had a positive impact on religion.43 Is it possible 
that the Court will not consider the impact of government actions 
when those actions give religion, especially more dominant religions, 
a substantial benefit44 and yet will consider the impact when the 
government attempts to prevent such disparate negative results?45    
 Still another possibility is that the Court has equated disparate 
treatment with hostility.46 This too is problematic because 
government entities engaged in disparate treatment, and parties who 
advocate for such treatment in Establishment Clause cases, may be 
motivated by many concerns that do not involve hostility toward 
 42. Compare the Court’s analysis of effects in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 
(2002), with the plurality’s use of hostility in Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 827–28 (2000) 
(plurality opinion). But see Locke v. Davey, 124 S. Ct. 1307, 1313–14 (2004) (holding the 
denial of state funding to a student pursuing a devotional-theology degree constitutional, even 
under a formally neutral program, but limiting the holding to training in devotional theology). 
 43. See e.g., Zelman, 536 U.S. 639; see id. at 687–88, 695–708 (Souter, J., dissenting) 
(suggesting that the Court glossed over the impact of the voucher program, which could not 
have been upheld if the Court had seriously looked at its effects); see also Ravitch, supra note 4, 
at 513–16, 520–23 (suggesting that the Zelman Court has taken any serious analysis of the 
effects of government programs out of the “effects test”). 
 44. See Ravitch, supra note 4, at 513–23 (suggesting that the impact of the program 
upheld in Zelman was to provide a substantial benefit to religion, especially to larger sects with 
established religious schools or the means of, and interest in, establishing such schools). 
      45. Implicit in the Court’s holding in Zelman is the possibility that the neutrality principle 
will be violated if religious organizations or individuals are denied access to open government 
funding programs, even if the reason for the denial is a concern that religious entities will 
receive a disproportionate benefit if such access is granted. But see Locke, 124 S. Ct. 1307 
(holding that a state has the ability to deny access to funding for training as a minister under an 
otherwise available government scholarship program). 
 46. This is apparently what a plurality of the court did in Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 827–28 
(2000) (plurality opinion). 
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religion.47 In fact, in some cases they may be motivated by a belief 
that such treatment protects religion or that it recognizes religion’s 
special place in our constitutional system.48 Whether such assertions 
are accurate or not, they do not evince hostility toward religion.49 
Given that earlier Courts recognized valid reasons for treating 
religion differently, even “less favorably” in some contexts, the 
current Court’s evolving notion of hostility may be quite different 
from that of earlier Courts.  
 If the Court’s implication of hostility relates only to the negative 
effects of the government action in aid and equal-access cases, rather 
than actual hostility on the part of government actors, the Court has 
created an interesting Establishment Clause doctrine indeed. The 
Court will overlook massive disparate favoritism of dominant 
religions (especially in the aid context),50 yet easily overturn 
government action that has the effect of disfavoring religion.51 If, on 
the other hand, the Court is relying on the idea that government 
entities are singling out religion for unfavorable treatment, then it 
needs to explain why that treatment is problematic in light of the 
Court’s earlier decisions that relied on separationist principles. 
Ironically, the Court uses the concepts of neutrality and hostility to 
 47. The biggest concerns may be: (1) fidelity to constitutional values, which until 
recently had a more separationist bent, see Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 
98, 102–05 (2001); id. at 131–34 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that when a school district 
denied access to a religious club due to concerns that the club would engage in religious 
instruction and proselytization, the district’s motivation seemed to be compliance with state 
law and Establishment Clause concerns); and (2) an intent to protect religion from the 
“impurity” of government, a concern that some have traced to Roger Williams, see LEVY, supra 
note 8, at 183–85. 
 48. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11 (1947) (holding that religious liberty can 
best be achieved by “a government . . . stripped of all power to tax, to support, or otherwise to 
assist any or all religions, or to interfere with the beliefs of any religious individual or group”); 
see also Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 211–12 (1948) (holding the 
same); LEVY, supra note 8, at 183–85 (noting the same). 
 49. See infra notes 76–80 and accompanying text. 
 50. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (upholding a city 
voucher program that ultimately sent millions of dollars in tuition to local religious schools—
94.6% of voucher students attended religious schools—and such schools were primarily of only 
one or two denominations). 
 51. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995). But 
see Locke v. Davey, 124 S. Ct. 1307 (2004) (suggesting that an exception to this approach 
exists when a state denies funding for training as a minister, but not clarifying whether the 
exception goes beyond such limited circumstances). 
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avoid doing so. The separationist approach, as used in some 
contexts, might be wrong, but it is not inherently hostile. 
The Rehnquist Court is certainly not the first to use the concept 
of hostility to describe the exclusion of religious entities from broad 
programs, but it is the first to place such immense faith in the 
concept of formal neutrality. It is the combination of the Court’s use 
of formal neutrality and the potential expansion of the Court’s use of 
hostility to undermine separation-driven arguments without directly 
confronting them that makes the Rehnquist Court’s recent use of 
hostility troubling. It is not that modern separationist arguments or 
motivations are inherently correct, but rather that calling them 
hostile to religion, and dismissing them as a result, demonstrates a 
complete lack of legal or intellectual rigor and tells us nothing about 
the merits of those arguments. The Court’s use of the term in Locke 
may be a step in the right direction because the Court appears to 
equate hostility with animus, but as was already explained, Locke is 
unclear about this and may be quite limited because of the facts 
involved.52 
So what does the Court’s evolving use of the concept of hostility 
tell us about the meaning of that term in the Establishment Clause 
context? First, it seems that hostile motives are certainly not a 
requirement for a finding that something is hostile toward religion. 
Second, much of what earlier Courts said about the Establishment 
Clause and its meaning—i.e., favoring a separationist approach53—
now apparently falls under the rubric of hostility toward religion.54 
Some scholars have long equated strong separationism with 
hostility,55 and the current Court apparently agrees. Yet, did those 
 52. See supra notes 22–31 and accompanying text. 
 53. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (developing a test for Establishment 
Clause cases based heavily on separationist principles); McCollum, 333 U.S. at 211 (using 
Thomas Jefferson’s metaphor of “a wall of separation between church and state” to interpret 
the Establishment Clause); Everson, 330 U.S. at 16. 
 54. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 827–28 (2000) (plurality opinion) 
(holding that treating religion differently in the context of government aid programs manifests 
hostility toward religion); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 (denying government funds to a 
student newspaper under a generally open funding program because the paper’s proselytizing 
message is viewpoint discrimination, and Establishment Clause concerns are not adequate to 
justify such viewpoint discrimination). 
 55. See RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND 
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1984); Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 
59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 124–25 (1992); see also Gedicks, supra note 14, at 671, 674, 693–94 
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who opposed the aid in Mitchell, or the officials at the University of 
Virginia in Rosenberger, act out of hostility toward religion, out of 
respect for the First Amendment, out of concern for some entirely 
different reason, or out of concern for some combination of these 
reasons? If the argument is simply that a facial distinction between 
religious and other entities is inherently hostile toward religion, 
using the term “hostility” seems to add little more than a rhetorical 
justification. 
IV. ACTUAL HOSTILITY AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
The Court’s failure to adequately define its notion of hostility 
does not mean that hostility toward religion does not exist. The 
question is how “hostility” should be defined under the 
Establishment Clause. Should purpose, effect, or both, be relevant to 
this question? The answer matters because the Court has been 
relatively consistent in holding that government cannot discourage 
religion without violating the Establishment Clause (although it has 
been quite lax in defining what would discourage religion).56  
Scholars have also argued that discouragement of religion, not just 
encouragement, can violate the Establishment Clause.57 Of course, 
the question remains as to what constitutes hostility, what 
constitutes discouragement, and whether the two are the same thing. 
This section asserts that hostility is a form of discouragement, but 
that discouragement is a broader concept. 
I am generally suspicious of placing a great deal of weight in a 
dictionary when defining terms that have important legal meaning, 
but the power and impact of the term “hostility” when used to 
describe government action vis-à-vis religion suggests that the 
(addressing hostility toward religion in U.S. Supreme Court opinions and American public 
life). 
 56. For a good example of an older case suggesting this, see Zorach v. Clauson, 343 
U.S. 306 (1952). For a good example of a newer case suggesting the same, see Mitchell, 530 
U.S. at 793 (plurality opinion). 
 57. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality 
Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993, 1001–02 (1990) (“[T]he religion clauses require 
government to minimize the extent to which it either encourages or discourages religious 
belief or disbelief, practice or nonpractice, observance or nonobservance. . . . But I must 
elaborate on what I mean by minimizing encouragement and discouragement. I mean that 
religion is to be left as wholly to private choice as anything can be. It should proceed as 
unaffected by government as possible.” (footnote omitted)); Ravitch, supra note 4, at 544–49 
(arguing that religion should neither be facilitated nor discouraged by government). 
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commonly understood meaning of that term—essentially hostile 
intent or general antagonism—is the best starting place for a 
workable definition under the Establishment Clause. When the 
Court uses the term “hostility” to justify its reasoning, people may 
draw on the commonly understood meaning of that term absent an 
alternative definition, which, as noted above, the Court has not 
provided.58 The Oxford Desk Dictionary defines “hostility” as (1) 
“being hostile; enmity” and as (2) “acts of warfare.”59 It defines 
“hostile” as (1) “of an enemy” and as (2) “unfriendly; opposed.”60 
Obviously, “hostility” suggests hostile intent or, at the very least, an 
antagonistic state of mind. This definition is consistent with the 
general use and understanding of the term in society at large. 
Therefore, when the Court uses the term “hostility” to describe 
government action toward religion or a religious entity (or to 
describe the position of the dissenting Justices), the implication is 
that there is some hostile intent on the part of government or other 
actors. As noted above, such intent may be entirely absent in the 
contexts where the Court uses the term “hostility,” unless one is 
willing to treat an intent to uphold perceived constitutional duties as 
hostile toward religion61 or claim that disparate treatment not 
motivated by hostile intent is hostile toward religion.62  
To be considered “hostile toward religion,” a party’s actions 
should involve some actual hostile intent or attitude toward religion 
qua religion or toward a specific religious entity. There are some 
obvious examples of this in recent Court decisions. For example, the 
actions of the city of Hialeah in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. 
City of Hialeah (a Free Exercise Clause case)63 are an excellent 
example of actual hostility toward religion. The city set up a system 
of ordinances that were designed to affect only Santerian animal 
sacrifice.64 The city’s actions were taken against a backdrop of 
professed enmity by some city residents, and even some city officials, 
 58. See supra notes 1, 3–6 and accompanying cases. 
 59. THE OXFORD DESK DICTIONARY, AMERICAN EDITION 271 (Laurence Urdang ed. 
1995). 
 60. Id. 
 61. See supra notes 18–21 and accompanying text. 
 62. This is apparently what the Court has been doing. See supra notes 18–21, 32–41 
and accompanying text. 
 63. 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
 64. Id. at 524–28. 
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toward the Santeria faith and its practice of animal sacrifice.65 The 
ordinances were found to violate the Free Exercise Clause because 
they demonstrated discrimination against a particular religion,66 but 
they might have also violated the Establishment Clause because the 
city seemingly engaged in hostile action designed to discourage 
religion (in this case a particular religion).67 
The plurality opinion in Mitchell v. Helms provides another 
example of actual hostility toward religion when it discussed the anti-
Catholic animus connected to the movement for Blaine 
amendments—state constitutional provisions modeled after a failed 
amendment to the U.S. Constitution that would have banned 
funding to religious schools.68 There is little doubt that the 
movement behind these amendments, and at least some of the 
motivation behind early separationism, was highly influenced by anti-
Catholic and, to a lesser extent, anti-ecclesiastical sentiment.69 At 
that time, the so-called Blaine amendments were motivated, at least 
in part, by hostility toward religion, and they were certainly designed 
to discourage the growth of the Catholic-school movement,70 which 
itself evolved in part as a response to the Protestant domination of 
the common schools and ultimately the early public schools.71 
Yet today there are other principles that may support the 
substance of the so-called Blaine amendments and separationism 
more generally.72 The motivations of state officials who currently 
support such “no aid” amendments, and of parties who sue to 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. passim. 
 67. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952) (“[W]e find no constitutional 
requirement which makes it necessary for government to be hostile to religion and to throw its 
weight against efforts to widen the effective scope of religious influence.”). 
 68. 530 U.S. 793, 828–29 (2000) (plurality opinion); see also HAMBURGER, supra note 
8, at 321–28, 335–42 (explaining that both before and after Senator Blaine’s failed attempt to 
amend the U.S. Constitution to prohibit any government funding of religious schools, there 
was a strong movement, heavily influenced by anti-Catholic animus, that agreed with Senator 
Blaine’s proposal). 
 69. See generally HAMBURGER, supra note 21 (recounting the evolution of the early 
separationist movement and the activities of groups such as the anti-Catholic nativists). 
 70. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 71. See LLOYD P. JORGENSON, THE STATE AND THE NON-PUBLIC SCHOOL 1825–
1925, at 83–85 (1987); FRANK S. RAVITCH, SCHOOL PRAYER AND DISCRIMINATION: THE 
CIVIL RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES AND DISSENTERS 5 (1999). 
 72. This can be seen in any number of articles defending the value of separationism. See, 
e.g., Green, supra note 8. 
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prevent government funding of religious entities, may have nothing 
to do with enmity or hostility toward religion generally or a specific 
religion.73 The Court’s rationale in Locke v. Davey supports this. 
While the Court held that the state constitutional provision in 
question was not a Blaine amendment,74 the Court acknowledged 
that the state’s denial of funding for ministerial training was not 
hostile toward religion.75 Given the definition of “hostility” above, 
however, it is hard to understand why the same conclusion would 
not apply to denials of funding or access in cases such as Mitchell and 
Rosenberger, even if the denial is unconstitutional for other reasons. 
Of course, the above examples demonstrate hostility toward a 
specific religion or specific religions, but some have suggested that 
separationism leads to a purging of religious views more generally, 
and is thus hostile toward religion.76 The broader relationship 
between religion and public life is complex and beyond the scope of 
this Article, but despite my concern that strict separationism may be 
unconstitutional and bad policy, it is not inherently hostile toward 
religion. In fact, some of its strongest supporters have been 
concerned with protecting religion.77 
Thus, whether or not current separationist-oriented doctrines 
and principles are proper interpretations of the Establishment Clause, 
calling them hostile toward religion is nothing more than a rhetorical 
slap or verbal barb. The Court and some scholars derive support and 
power from using the term, but the term adds nothing of substance 
to their arguments. Unless the government entity denying funding 
or access or the party challenging government action demonstrates a 
negative intent or attitude toward religion generally or a specific 
religion, there is no proof of hostility toward religion. Disparate 
treatment in this context does not equate to hostility because those 
 73. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 912–13 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 74. Locke v. Davey, 124 S. Ct. 1307, 1314 n.7 (2004). 
 75. Id. at 1313–14. 
 76. See STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: HOW AMERICAN LAW AND 
POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 106–23 (1993); Gedicks, supra note 14, at 674, 
678–82, 693–96 (connecting the distinction between public and private aspects of religion in 
cases and society at large to the broader liberal tradition). See generally NEUHAUS, supra note 
55.  
 77. See Gaffney, supra note 14, at 302 (noting that leading separationist Leo Pfeffer was 
not “in any real sense hostile to religion” and that in fact Pfeffer “is a devout Jew who is 
convinced that religion will thrive—even that it can only thrive—when it does not enjoy the 
benefit of government subsidies”). 
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engaging in that treatment are often motivated by constitutional 
concerns or concerns for avoiding divisiveness in the community, 
rather than hostility toward religion.78 
Moreover, in the absence of hostile intent, disparate impact must 
be analyzed as an effect of government action, rather than as its 
purpose. I strongly advocate an approach to the Establishment 
Clause that takes effects seriously, whether those effects favor 
religious entities or disfavor them.79 The Court, however, writes off 
effects that seem to favor religion in cases like Zelman, yet puts great 
weight in effects that seem to disfavor religion in cases like Mitchell 
and Rosenberger.80 It is possible that the Court sees this apparent 
conflict but does not view it as such, thus intending its doctrine to 
require serious examination of effects when those effects harm 
religious entities, but not when they favor such entities.81 However, 
this remains unclear. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Court has not relied heavily on the concept of hostility in its 
recent Establishment Clause decisions, but the concept has had an 
impact. Given the Court’s recent focus on formal neutrality in a 
number of contexts, such as government aid and equal access, the 
concept of hostility may take on more importance. Because of its 
narrow holding, Locke v. Davey does not clearly point in one 
direction or the other with regard to the Court’s future use of the 
hostility concept. When the Court has attempted to use the concept 
of hostility in recent years, it has done so only in a rhetorical sense: it 
presumes that the lack of formal neutrality is hostile toward religion. 
Yet this is not an adequate or accurate definition of “hostility.” 
 78. See supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text. 
 79. Ravitch, supra note 4, at 544–73. 
 80. Compare Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (upholding a voucher 
program in which 94.6% of voucher funds went to religious schools that represented only a few 
denominations), with Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (plurality opinion) (holding 
that exclusion of religious schools from a general government program supporting the loan of 
educational equipment because the religious schools are “pervasively sectarian” reflects hostility 
toward religion and is unconstitutional), and Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of 
Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (suggesting that the exclusion of a religious student newspaper from 
a general funding program would disfavor religious viewpoints and is therefore 
unconstitutional). 
 81. This is consistent with the approach taken by some scholars. See, e.g., NEUHAUS, 
supra note 55. 
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Disparate impact and even disparate treatment (depending on the 
motivation for that treatment) are not necessarily evidence of 
hostility toward religion. 
 
